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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Respondent concurs with Appellant's statement of the nature of the case as set forth in

appellant's brief.
B.

Course of the Proceedings.
Respondent concurs with Appellant's statement of the course of the proceedings as set

forth in appellant's brief.
C.

Statement of Facts.
Respondent generally agrees with Appellant's statement of the facts, however certain

details were omitted and therefore the statement of facts including omitted details is set forth
herein:
The medical care at issue in this case was rendered January 26 and 27,2006. (A.R. 9394.) Approximately 2.5 months earlier on November 9, 2005, the patient applied for and
obtained private medical insurance through an insurance company called Assurant. (A.R. 116117). The enrollment form for acquiring the insurance required the patient to disclose all
consultations, advice, or treatment he had had for heart or circulatory disorders for the
preceding five (5) years. See id.
On November 9,2005, Patient made application for the Policy by completing a policy
enrollment form. (A.R. 116) According to the enrollment form, Patient was required to
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disclose for a period of five years all prior medical consultations, advice, or treatment
including medication for heart or circulatory system disorder and including heart attack or
chest pain. See id. The enrolllnent form provided that any misrepresentations were grounds
for rescission. See id. The enrolllnent form stated: "NOTE: The plan

. . . cannot be issued if

YES is answered to any questions 2-4" See id. Patient answered " N O and thereby failed to
disclose any pre-existing conditions, consultations, or treatments over the past five years. See
id.

On June 2,2006, Assurant denied coverage and rescinded the entire Policy based on
misrepresentations, denying prior medical services in the November 9,2007 enrollinent
application. (A.R. p. 138). According to the denial letter, not only had Patient had significant,
extensive, and undeclared medical services performed within one year of enrolllnent and he
had also received such services as recently as seven days prior to coinpleting the November 9,
2007 enrollment application. This denial letter states in pertinent part:

"Question No. 4 was answered "no." However, during the normal course of
investigating a claim for benefits, we received medical information showing that you
received medical consultation, advice, or treatment for alcoholism. a heart disorder and
elevated glucoseldeveloping diabetes within the 5 years prior to the date the enrollment
fonn was completed and was therefore ineligible for this coverage. Specifically, we are
taking this action based upon medical records provided by vintage Court Medical,
Kootenai Medical Center and Bonner General Hospital for dates of service December
16, 2004, December 21, 2004, August 2, 2005 and November 2, 2005."
(A.R. 138-139)
Patient has never appealed the June 2,2006 denial and rescission of Policy. (A.R.
generally)
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The basis for the denial of this claim by Bonner County is the untimeliness of the
application. (See A.R. 13-14,yn 1,2,3.). Bonner County determined the application
was untimely because it found that the patient knew, or should have known, that the
patient's private insurance policy excluded coverage for "pre-existing conditions." The
County found that the patient knew that he had a pre-existing heart condition at the time
he applied for the private health insurance. Because LC. $3l-3505(4)(a)(ii) requires that
the patient "reasonably be expected to meet the eligibility criteria" for the private health
insurance coverage in order to justify a "delayed" application, and, because of the
patient's actual knowledge of his health history and actual andlor imputed knowledge of
the terms of the policy, the County concluded that the conditions precedent for the filing
of a delayed application were not met, the rendering the application untimely. Also
included in the basis for the denial was the fact that the patient did not appeal his denial
by the insurance company, thus also rendering him not qualified to file a "delayed"
application.
11. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1. Did the County Commissioners and District Court err in finding that the Patient failed to
properly submit a "Delayed Application" as required by Idaho Code $31-3505(4)?
2. Does Bonner County have the right or authority to deny this application on remand or
otherwise, on bases other than the issue of timeliness?
111.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

Respondent is claiming attorney fees both below and on this appeal based on Idaho Code
$12-117, Idaho Code $12-121, and Idaho Appellate Rule 40.
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IV.

STANDARD OF REVIEW.

Pursuant to Idaho Code $31-3505, denial by a board of county commissioners of a11 application
for indigent benefits is reviewed under the Administrative Procedures Act, Idaho Code, Title
67, Chapter 52. Judicial review of an administrative order is limited to the record. See St.
Alphonsus Medical Ctr. v. Canyon County, 120 Idaho 420,423,816 P.2d 977,980 (1991),
overruled on other grounds by University ofUtah Hosp. &Medical Ctr. v. Twin Falls County,
122 Idaho 1010, 842 P.2d 689 (1992). A reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for
that of the administrative agency on questions of fact and will uphold an agency's finding of
fact if supported by substantial and competei~tevidence. See Boise Group Homes v. Dep't of
Health and Welfare, 123 Idaho 908, 909, 854 P.2d 251,252 (1993). A reviewing court may
reverse the agency's decision or reinand for further proceedings only if substantial rights of the
appellant have beell prejudiced. See Idaho Code $67-5279(4). Historically, the Idaho Supreme
Court has stated that it will review the decision of a Board independently, as if the case were
directly appealed to this Court, while giving serious consideration to the district court's
decision. E. Idaho Reg? Med. Ctr. v. Ada County Bd. of County Gomm'rs (Application of
Hamlet), 139 Idaho 882, 884, 88 P.3d 701,703 (2004).
V.

ARGUMENT

A. Timeliness

1. Background

In the 1984 Idaho Supreme Court decision Carpenter v. Twin Falls County, 107 Idaho
575, 582-83,691 P.2d 1190, 1197-98 (1984), the Court held that untimeliness of ail application
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for medical indigent assistance is not a per-se jurisdictional bar to a claim. In 1984 Carpenter,
supra, the Court also ruled that a County must demonstrate prejudicial effects resulting from the
delay in order to deny an application on the grounds of untimeliness. 107 Idaho at 583.
In 2003, the Idaho Supreme Court in IHC Hosps., Inc. v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 188,
75 P.3d 1198 (20031, acknowledged that Car.penter was statutorily superseded on the issue of
the effect of an untimely application io light of 1996 revisions to the indigent statutes
The Court in IHC Hospitals, supra, held:
In 1996, the legislature amended LC. $ 3 1-3511 by adding penalties for failure to
comply with technical requirements. In addition, I.C. $31-3504 has been completely rewritten since Carpenter, with that section now providing specific guidelines for
submitting an application for financial assistance. The Court in Carpenter held that a
claim which violated technical requirements should not be denied in the absence of a
statutory mandate to do so. The current statutes mandate denial of a claim for failure to
satis& the express timelines.
139 Idaho at 191. [Emphasis added].
In 1996, I.C. $3 1-3511 was amended to provide:
The board shall not have iurisdiction to hear and shall not awprove an application for
necessary medical services unless an application in the form prescribed by this chapter
is received by the clerk in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.
I.C. $31-3511(2). [Emphasis added].
In 2004, Idaho Senate Bill 1301 (hereinafter "2004 S.B. 1301") intensified these 1996
requirements, previously recognized by IHC Hospitals, supra, by placing even stronger
restrictive language squarely within the medical indigent statute pertaining to timeliness itself,
and expressly providing that the language apply to the timeliness section, i.e., I.C. $31-3505,
including LC. 31-3505(4)(b) and I.C. $31-3505(5) which states:
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Failure by the patient and/or obligated persons to complete the application process
described in this section [is., internally self-referencing the section primarily treating
the subject matter of timing], up to and including any reasonable appeal of any denial of
benefits, with the applicable program noted in paragraph (a) of this subsection, shall
result in denial of the county assistance application.
I.C. 31-3505(4)@) [Emphasis added.]
(5) Any application or request which fails to meet the provisions of this section [i.e.,
internally self-referencing the section primarily treating the subject matter of timing],
a ~ d oother
r
provisions of this chapter, shall be denied. [Emphasis added].

The 2004 amended I.C. $31-3505 medical indigent code expressly imposes additional
timeliness restrictive language without subtracting from the 1996 LC. $3 1-351l(2)
requirements. Therefore, 2004 I.C. $31-3505 can only be interpreted as imposing stricter
technical requirements than those imposed by the 2003 IHC court.
2. Definition of "bona fide application"

Notwithstanding the fact that 2004 S.B. 1301 only intensified restrictive language,
Appellant interprets the language as relaxing the 1996 restrictive language to the prejudicial
impacts standard of the 1984 Carter court. (Appellant's brief p. 5-6).
Notwithstanding the above, Appellant argues that 2004 S.B. 1301 abrogates strict
timelines. Appellant's argument implies that a small part of the definition of "bona-fide" or
"good-faith", as articulated in I.C. $31-3505(4)(a), must be compatible with its lexical opposite
"bad-faith", so long as there are no prejudicial impacts. This result is untenable as can be
demonstrated by an analysis of I.C. $31-3505(4)(a). (Appellant's brief p. 5-6).
I.C. $31-3505(4)(a) provides a statutory conjunctive five part definition of the elements

particula~izingthe definition of a 180-day delayed "bona-fide application" as follows:
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(4) A delayed application for necessary medical services may be filed up to one hundred
eighty (180) days beginning with the first day of the provision of necessary medical
services provided that:
(a) Written documentation is included with the application or no later than fortyfive (45) days after an application has been filed showing that a bona fide
application or claim has been filed-for social security disability insurance,
supplemental security income, third party insurance, medicaid, medicare, crime
victim's compensation, and/or worker's compensation. A bona fide application
mmthat:
(i) The application was timely filed within the appropriate agency's
application or claim time period;
(ii) Given the circumstances of the patient and/or obligated persons, the
patient andlor obligated persons, and given the information available at the
time the application or claim for other resources is filed, would reasonably
be expected to meet the eligibility criteria for sucl~resources; 4
(iii) The application was filed with the appropriate agency in such a time
and manner that, if approved, it would provide for payment coverage of
the bills included in the county application;
(iv) In the discretion of the board, bills on a delayed application which
would not have been covered by a successful application or timely claim
to the other resource(s) may be denied by the board as untimely;
(v) In the event an application is filed for supplemental security income,
an Idaho medicaid application must also have been filed within the
department of health and welfare's application or claim time period to
provide payment coverage of eligible bills included in the county
application.
I.C. 3 1-3505(4)(a). [Emphasis added].
In construing a statute, the words of the statute must be given their plain, usual and
ordinary meaning. WaNcer v. HensZey Trucking, 107 Idaho 572,691 P.2d 1187 (1984). LC. 313505(4)(a) sets out to define the expression "bona fide application." The statute does so by
setting forth a list of five conjunctive elements which explain or particularize the definition of
the expression "bona-fide application." I11 construing a statute, words must be given their
ordinary meaning, therefore these five elements should be read as explaining and qualifying,
while not nullifying or doing violence to the ordinary legal meaning of the component
expression "bona fide" found within the larger phrase, "bona fide application". The I.C. 31-
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3505(4)(a)(iv) portion of LC. 53 1-3505(4)(a) should be interpreted consistently with the
ordinary legally accepted definition of "bona fide" or "good faith" as I.C. $31-3505(4)(a) sets
the controlling preamble i.e., "bona-fide application" for the five Roman numeral subsections
further explaining andlor qualifying the meaning of a "bona-fide application".
Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) defines "bona fide" as follows::
bona fide - adj. [Latin "in good faith"] 1. Made in good faith; without fraud or deceit. 2.
Sincere; genuine. See GOOD FAITH. -bona fide, adv.
Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004), defines "good faith" as follows:
n. A state of mind consisting in (1) honesty in belief or pumose, (2) faithfulness to one's
duty or oblirration, (3) observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in a
given trade or business, or {4) absence of intent to defraud or to seek unconscionable
advantage. -Also termed bona,fides. Cf. bad faith. - good-faith, adj. "The phrase
'good faith' is used in a variety of contexts, and its meaning varies somewhat with the
context. Good faith performance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to
an agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other
party; it excludes a variety of twes of conduct characterized as involving 'bad faith'
because they violate community standards of decency, faiiness or reasonableness. The
appropriate remedy for a breach of the duty of good faith also varies with the
circumstances." Restatement (Second) ofContvacts 5 205 ant. a (1979). [...].

[Emphasis added].
The plain, usual, and ordinary meaning of "bona fide" implies good faith and sincerity.
Good faith and sincerity are closely linked to the applicant or responsible party's state of mind.
The meaning of "good faith" and "bona fide", as defined in Black's Law Dictionary, supra, are
facially opposed to a extra-mental standard such as extra-mental consequences, damages, or
prejudicial effects. Notwithstanding the plain meaning of "good faith", as defined in Black's
Law Dictionary, above, Appellant's argument implies that 2004 S.B. 1301 implies that a good
faith application is conceptually consistent with a bad faith application where there are no
demonstrated prejudicial effects. (Appellant's Brief p. 5-6). This interpretive outcome does
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violence to the plain, usual, and ordinary meaning of "bona fide" as defined in Black's Law
Dictionary, supra. Appellant only arrives at this reading of I.C. 31-3505(4)(a)(iv) by forgetting
entirely that this subsection is merely an element of and imbedded, contextualized, and even
devoted to the definition of "good faith" as set forth in LC. $31-3505(4)(a). Furthermore, as
stated above, I.C. 53 1-3505(4)(a) is imbedded within statutory language imposing stringent
technical requirements and should not be interpreted at variance with those stringent
requirements i.e., 1996 I.C. $31-351 1(2) and 2004 LC. $31-3504(4) and (5). Appellant's
interpretation enables the submission of bad-faith applications in a good-faith application only
statute. This interpretation twists the statutory language to arrive at a result patently opposite
and contrary to the plain meaning of the statute and effects a result patently opposite of that
expressed and intended by the legislature.
The legislature has collstructive knowledge of existing case law when amending
statutes. lil the case at hand, the 2004 legislature had at least imputed prior knowledge of the
IHC Hospitals, supra, holding acknowledging the existence of strict timelines within the
indigence statutes. Ultrawall, Inc. v. Washington Mut. Banlc, FFSB, 25 P.3d 855 Idal10,2001.
Had the 2004 legislature intended to abrogate the 2003 IHC Hospitals decision, supra, and
intended on reinstating a 1984 prejudicial impacts test, it would have clearly added language

identifying prejudicial impacts as the primary test and would not have utilized the expression
"bona fide application" as argued above.

3. Limited Scope of Discretionary Exception
I.C. 31-3505(4)(a)(iv) does, in fact, articulate a discretionary exception to technical
requirenlents. This discretionary exception is not a bad faith compatible discretionary exception.
Therefore, the scope of this "discretionary exception" is not universally broad and expansive.
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The discretionary exception cannot be read in the most general possible sense because it cannot
be read inconsistently or in disharmony with the controlling and overriding I.C. 3 1-3505(4)(a)
concept of good faith as defined in Black's Law Dictionary, supra e.g., The discretionary
exception cannot be read as compatible with patently bad-faith applications. Furthermore, the
discretionary exception cannot be read at a level of generality at variance with other parts of the
Roman numeral i-v definitional elements, including, without limitation, subsection ii which
states:
of the patient and/or obligated persons, the patient andor
"(ii) Given the circumsta~~ces
obligated persons, and given the information available at the time the application or claim
for other resources is filed, would reasonably be expected to meet the eligibility criteria
for such resources;"
[Underlining Emphasis added].
Therefore, whatever the precise scope of the I.C. 3 1-3505(4)(a)(iv) discretionary
exception, that exception cannot apply where the application is not otherwise in good faith or
without "reasonable expectation."

Only after the board makes a threshold finding of good

faith or reasonable expectation can the board exercise its judgment in applying the discretionary
exception of e.g., prejudicial impact, for example. Once an otherwise non-qualified claim or
bill has been determined to be in good-faith, and only once this has happened, can the board, in
its discretion, decide to approve it, notwithstanding other errors not bearing on bad faith and
reasonable expectation given the information available at the time of application filing.
4. Separate claims or bills on an otherwise approved application.

A viable way to preserve the natural meaning and harmonize all of the five conjunctive
definitional elements of the "good-faithlbona-fide" definition under I.C. 53 1-3505(4)(a) is by
reading I.C. $31-3505(4)(a)(iv) as identifjilng collateral bills or collateral claims which were
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL - 14
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not originally joined with, primary claims which had been already successfully approved.
These collateral claims may have been improperly separated or excluded for a variety of
reasons. In other words, the types of ancillary bills subject to the discretionary exception
addressed by LC. 53 1-3505(4)(a)(iv)would or could be the subset of bills not properly
presented or acco~npanyingthe primary original approved presenting ancillary bills pertaining
to the same or similar underlying treatment. For example, medical invoices from known and
identified providers may have been missed in the original billing statements or, alternatively,
certain providers may have entirely failed to have been included as named providers on the
original approved application. An alternative viable harmonization strategy would be to
interpret I.C. $31-3505(4)(a)(iv) as allowing a discretionary denial when the programmatic
requirements of e.g., Medicaid could never have been met at all.
5.2004 S.B. 1301 legislative history.
To the extent the plain language of the statute does not prove that I.C. 3 1-3505(4)(a)
requires a bona-fide and good-faith application, then, when construing an ambiguous or vague
statute, the focus of the Court is to determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature.
George W. Walkins Family v. Messengev, 118 Idaho 537,540,797 P.2d 1385, 1388 (1990). In

ascertaining this intent, not only must the literal words of the statute be examined but also the
public policy behind the statute and its legislative history. Messenger, 86 Idaho at 29-30,382
P.2d at 915.

In 2004 31-3505(4)(a) was amended by S.B. 1301 as follows:
"3 1-3505. TIME AND MANNER OF FILING APPLICATIONS AND REQUESTS.
[...] (a) Written documentation is included with the application or no later than
forty-fwe (45) days after an application has been filed showing
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL - 15
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that a s bona fide application or claiin has been fded for social
security disability insurance, supplemental security incon~e,third party insurance,
medicaid, medicare, crime victim's compensation, andlor worker's compensation. A
bona tide application means that:
. ,
(i) The application was timely filed within

. ,
. .
. . the appropriate
~
.

agency's application or claim time period; and
(ii) Given the circumstances of the patient and/or obligated persons, the patient
and/or obligated persons, and given the information available a t the time the
application or claim for other resources is filed, would reasonably be expected to
meet the eligibility criteria for such resources; and
(iii) The application was filed with the appropriate agency in such a time and
manner that, if approved, it would provide for payment coverage of the bills
included in the county application; and
iiv) I n the discretion of the board, bills on a delayed application which would not
have been covered by a successful a~plicationor timely claim to the other
resource(s) may be denied by the board as untimely; and
(v) I n the event an application is filed for supplemental security income, an Idaho
medicaid application must also have been filed within the department of health
and welfare's application or claim time period to provide payment coverage of
eligible bills included in the county application."

2004 Idaho Laws Ch. 300 (S.B. 1301).
[Underlining emphasis added].
As stated above, courts must assume that the Idaho Legislature had full knowledge of
the existing judicial decisions and case law ofthe state when it amended a statute. This means
that in order for Appellant's good-faith allows bad-faith position to work the legislative history
should demonstrate that the Idaho Legislature knew they were superseding the most current
case law acknowledged by 2003 IHC Hospitals, supra. However, the legislative history set
forth below permits no such conclusion.
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First, the 2004 S.B. 1301 Purpose Statement reads as follows:
"The purpose of this legislation is to provide guidclines that clearly state when, how and
who should be considered when filing a delayed application for medically indigent
assistance. The original intent of the 180 dav delaved application process was to
encourage providers to pursue other legitimate avenues of payment before filing an
application for countv medical indigent assistance, so that fewer applications would be
received reauesting taxpayer assistance with an indieent's medical bills. This has worked
well when the spirit as well as the law has been properly followed. In some areas of the
State the purpose of the existing law has been thwarted by those who have begun using
the delaved application process as a method of obtaining more time to file a request for
assistance. When this occurs the indigent has sometimes dissipated assets that could have
provided reimbursement to the property taxpayers for the assistance provided. Reliance
on tl~eproperty taxpayers should remain a last resort. This technical correction seeks to
close the loophole in the process being exploited in some pats of the State while still
meeting the original intent of the legislature to allow a delayed application to be filed
when there is a demonstrated active pursuit of other sources of pament before a request
for assistance bom the property taxpayers is made."
2004 Idaho Law CH 300 - S.B. 1301. [Underlining emphasis added].
The Senate Health and Welfare Committee minutes pertaining to 2004 S.B. 1301 dated
Friday, February 27,2004, recount that Teresa Wolf, the Social Services director for Nez Perce
County, presented the following:
"This bill, SB 1301 relating to Medical Indigency, will amend Sections 31-3502 and
31-3505, Idaho code, was presented by Teresa Wolf, Social Services director for Nez
Perce County.
The purpose of this bill is to close a loo~holethat exists in the current law dealing with
the 180-day delayed application process. The original intent of the 180 day delayed
application was to encourage a provider or applicant to seek other resources that the
individual inav le~itilnatelvaualifv for.
Generally, the process for applying to the county requires an application be submitted
within 3 1 days after a person receives emergency services. However, the provider may
choose to file a delayed county assistance application, if it is determined that the
Applicant may qualify for one of 6 resources. The resources listed in the law are:
medicaid, medicare, social security, crime victims, worker's comp, and 3rd party
insurance. Because counties are the payers of last resort that resource should be applied
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for before seeking property tax assistance. After determining that an individual may
qualify for one of the listed resources, the provider or applicant can then file a county
indigent application up to 180 days after the service is rendered by the provider.
Hopefully, some time within the 180 days one of the resources may become available to
the applicant or notify the applicant or provider they have been approved, thereby
making it unnecessary to file with the county.
The problem that has occurred, primarily in the north without state providers, is that the
law is vague in its description of the intended processes. Some providers have admitted
that they use the section if they miss the 3 1-day filing window. Training has been
provided by both the counties and the Idaho Hospital association to our out-of-state
providers, but the practice still Continues.
The counties originally ameed to seek repeal of the section. but after further
investigation it was determined that it would have caused a significant impact on some
of our larger counties. The 180 day delayed application process does work when used
properly and many of the providers comply with the intent. The change in the language
clearly outlines the process for filing for other resources and what is expected of the
applicant. Curreiltly, the language makes it is only necessary to file for one of the six
listed resources even if the applicant had no chance of qualifying. The unnecessary
filings have at times caused an additional burden to be placed upon the Department of
Health and Welfare due to these frivolous filings."
Senate Health and Welfare Committee minutes dated Friday, February 27,2004 pertaining to
SB 1301. [Underlining emphasis added].
After Teresa Wolf made her presentation, the Senate Health and Welfare Committee
minutes recount that Tony Poinelli, the deputy director of the Idaho Association of Counties,
testified and requested that the Committee support 2004 S.B. 1301 as follows:
"Tony Poinelli, the deputy director of the Idaho Association of Counties, testified and
requested the committee to support SB1301, with the following proposed amendments:

.

First amendment, Page 3, line 37- makes' it clear that counties will add
appropriate documentation until the end of the investigative process (45 days)
Second amendment, Line 49 - clarifies that the information the provider has
available at the time the resource is filed for can be accepted as long as the person
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would reasonably be expected to meet the criteria for the resource.

.

.

Third amendment, Line 53 - deletes "all."
Fourth amendment, Page 4 - adds language to a new subsection that this clarifies
that those bills not covered by the resource being applied for may be denied by the
Board.
A final amendment only changes the subsection numbering."

Senate Health and Welfare Committee minutes dated Friday, February 27, 2004 pertaining to SB

1301.
As stated in the purpose statement and Committee minutes cited above, the 2004 S.B.
1301, as it pertained to I.C. 31-3505(4)(a), was originally supported by the Idaho Association of
Counties (hereinafter "LAC") in the Senate Health and Welfare Committee for the purpose of
decreasing the number of frivolous and unnecessary 180-day applications. There is no
indication that 2004 S.B. 1301 was introduced or accepted for the purposes of relaxing the strict
timelines, but rather the purpose statement and minutes indicate that 2004 S.B. 1301 was
introduced and passed by the legislature in order to add an additional "good faith" layer of
protection against abuse of the 180-day delayed application process.
The reason LAC supported 2004 S.B. 1301 was to add and not to take away from existing
requirements to ensure a demonstrated, active, and bona-fide and good faith effort to acquire
these additional resources. In fact according to Teresa WoEf;supra, the counties originally agreed
to seek repeal of the 180-day delayed application section altogether to avoid these abuses, but
ultimately the counties decided not to pursue repeal of the 3 1-3505(4) section because it would
have had a significant negative impact on some of Idaho's larger counties. The legislative history
cited above illustrates that the purpose of 2004 S.B. 1301 is not to relax, nullify, or abrogate the
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strict timelines recognized by IHC Hosps., supra, but rather to make a "technical amendment"
which "closes a loophole" by adding requirements rather than striking requirements for a
successll 180-day delayed application in order to prevent frivolous applications by adding a
good-faith layer to the 180-day delayed application process.
As argued above Appellant attempts to avoid the ordinary meaning of good faith by
adopting an interpretation which viltually ignores the mental standard of good faith and looks
instead myopically to prejudicial effects and case law which was nullified in 1996. Appellant's
interpretation inverts the legislative purpose and the plain meaning of the text underwriting 2004

S.B. 1301. Interpretations that could lead to absurd results are disfavored. Ada County v.

Gibson, 126 Idaho 854,856,893 P.2d 801 at 803.
6. Conclusion.

In conclusion the legislative history as well as the plain meaning of the I.C. 31-3505(4)(a)
emendatory text support the proposition that 2004 S.B. 1301 was intended to add requirements to
the strict timelines rather than lessen requirements for a successful 180-day delayed application.

B. Exhaustion of insurance company appeals
Respondent also based its denial on the grounds that patient never appealed his denial of
coverage
Idaho Code $3 1-3505(4)(b) provides in pertinent part:
"(4) A delayed application for necessary medical services may be filed [.. .] provided that:
(b) Failure by the patient andlor obligated persons to complete the application process
described in this section, up to and including any reasoilable appeal of any denial of
benefits, with the applicable program noted in paragraph (a) of this subsection, shall result
in denial of the county assistance application."
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Idaho Code $31-3505(4)@)requires reasonable appeals of denials. In the case at hand,
Bonner County specifically found that: "Mr T. knew he had a preexisting condition. Patient's
policy states 'no recovery for pre-existing conditions'." (A.R. 12,726).
Appellant argues that "Given this finding it follows that any appeal by the patient to his
insurance company upon its denial of coverage would be frivolous, and therefore, not
"reasonable". (Appellant's brief p. 6-7).
Appellant's interpretation is formalistic and succeeds only by de-contextualizing LC. 8313505(4)(b) from the immediate context of I.C. $31-3505(4)(a) which supplies the good-faith
presupposition for 8I.C. 3 1-3505(5). I.C. 53 1-3505(4)(a)(ii)provides:
of the patient and/or obligated persons, the patient andlor
(ii) Given the circumsta~~ces
obligated persons, and given the information available at the time the application or
claim for other resources is filed, would reasonably be expected to meet the eligibility
criteria for such resources;
I.C. 53 1-3505(4)(a)(ii). [Underlining emphasis added].
Appellant cannot advance its good faith argument that #l. The application was both in
good faith and reasonable, as required by LC. $31-3505(4)(a), while at the same time advancing
its futility argument that #2. A n appeal of the denial of insurance company benefits would be
futile, because the application for insurance benefits was made in bad faith as provided in I.C.
53 1-3505(4)(b). If Appellant succeeds in its futility argument on the basis that the patient
applied for a health insurance policy ill bad faith, then the Appellant cannot at the same time
assert that the patient applied for insurance benefits in good faith. I11 other words the patient
could make no reasonable appeal under LC. 53 1-3505(4)(b) because of the patient's bad faith in
procuring the insurance policy in the first place. This implies that the patient could not have
submitted a bona fide application under LC. 53 1-3505(4)(a) because the patient knew that he
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procured his insurance policy in bad faith in the first place as well as at the time patient applied
for benefits under said insurance policy.
C. Income and Other Resources.
Bonner County concluded that since a timely 180-day delayed application was not
submitted, the board did not need to make findings on other factors of eligibility such as the
patient's indigency. Bonner County's Finding of Fact No. 29 supporls this contention and reads
as follows:
Since there are no tax returns for 2006, this issue remains contested and unresolved.
The Board decided not to make a decision based on projected income, since the
numbers provided cannot be verified, and there is a lot of speculation as to what would
be allowed per IRS rules on self employment. There was insufficient information to
determine the financial aspect of the case, unable to prove or disapprove the numbers.
The Idaho Supreme Court in Mercy Medical Center v. Ada County, Bd. ofcounty
Commissioners ofAda County, 146 Idaho 226,233, 192 P.3d 1050, 1057 (2008) has previously
decided that a board need not decide all dispositive issues at once. Mercy, supra, also decided
that the proper remedy when a board erroneously decides a dispositive issue, but leaves other
issues undecided is reinand for hrlher proceedings and fact finding.
Mercy, supra, was a case in which the patient submitted a delayed application to Ada
County for indigent medical assistance and the County denied the application, on the basis of
non-residency. The Board did not address whether the treatment received by the patient was
medically necessary, nor did the Board address whether she was indigent. The District Court
vacated the Board decision after the county admitted error on its finding of non-residency and
remanded it to the County for further proceedings. The Mercy Court reviewed the question of the
district court's decision to remand the matter to the Board for further findings rather than
remanding with directions to approve the application. The hospital argued that the appropriate
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statutory remedy for the Board's error is to deem the application approved. The Mercy Court
noted that the Board did not make findings as to all factors of eligibility:
The determination whether an individual is entitled to medical indigency benefits
requires consideration of other factors of eligibility besides residency. Since the Board
summarily concl~~i.cd
that they:>ls not a rcs~<!ei~t
bhecsusc slic_vdvcu~nen~etlalien. and ihusinL.liqible for benefits. ir did nu1 make findinas of rhe_t)=
normally considered when making a determination of residency, such as the Patient's personal and family circumstances, her length of stay in Ada County, her employment in
Ada County, or her subjective intent to remain in Ada County. For the same reason, the
Board made no fmdings as to the other factors of eligibility, i.e., the Patient's indigency
and the medical necessity of the services provided. The absence of these critical findings
reauires us to consider the proper procedure for filling the lacunae.
146 Idaho 226 [Underlining emphasis added].
The Mercy Court then analyzed the importance of specificity of findings by the lower tribunal
and determined that the board's duty to make reasonable inquiry is satisfied if the board makes a
written determination denying the application based on any dispositive factor as follows:
Under the APA, "specificity in the findings and reasons of the lower tribunal is vital."
Intermountain Health Care, Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Caribou County, 108 Idaho
757, 762, 702 P.2d 795,800 (1985). While the applicant carries the initial burden of
proof in establishing a prima facie showing of medical indigency, that burden of proof
shifts to the county to rebut the applicant's claims, which carries with it a reciprocal duty
to make a reasonable inquiry into the grounds for the application. Salinas v. Canyon
County, 117 Idaho 218,221,786 P.2d 61 1,614 (Ct.App.1990). [I21 Mercy maintains
that, due to the Board's failure to fulfill its reciprocal duties, the application must be
deemed approved without remand. Mercy bases this contention on I.C. $ 3 1-351l(4)
which provides: "If the board fails to act upon an application within the time lines
required under this chapter, the application shall be deemed approved and payment made
as provided in this chapter." We have held that the failure to strictly comply with these
time limits requires a county to pay the claims advanced in an application. See e.g.,
Ottesen v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Madison County, 107 Idaho 1099, 1100-01,695 P.2d 1238,
1239-40 (1985) (applying I.C. 5 31-3505, the previous penalty provision of the medical
indigency statutes). This is not, however, an instance in which the County failed to act
upon the ap~lication.thus triggering the penalty provision of I.C. 5 3 1-351l(4). In the
instant case, the Board did issue a written determination denying the application within
the statutory timeframe, albeit solely upon an erroneous legal premise. Therefore, we
conclude that the penalty provisions of the statute do not apply to this application, and
conseauentle the possibility of remand is not foreclosed.
146 Idaho 226 [Underlining emphasis added].
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The Mercy, supra, Court then explained that Idaho Code 5 67-5279 in conjunction with
prior case law generally prohibit a reviewing court from making its own factual determination,
but instead to remand the issue to the board for further proceedings as follows:
Idaho Code 6 67-5279 states: "If the agencv action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in
whole or in part, and remanded for furfher proceedings as necessary." Although reversal
of the agency action is not expressly an option of the reviewing court under the language
of I.C. 5 67-5279, we have noted that "[tlhe reviewing court can reverse or modify the
county decision only in limited circumstances, such as when the county's decision is
affected by error of law, is clearly erroneous in view of the whole record, or is found to
be arbitrary and capricious." IHCHosp., Inc. v. Teton Countj, 139 Idaho 188, 189,75
P.3d 1198, 1199 (2003) (citing Idaho County v. Idaho Dep't ofHealth & Weyare, 128
Idaho 846, 848,920 P.2d 62,64 (1996)). [13] [14] We recognize that, despite the absence
of formal findings by the Board, the agency record contains information submitted by the
Patient regarding her financial resources, habitation history, emplovment, and medical
documents, which would tend to support a finding:of eligibility on remand. However,
when a board fails to malce a factual determination on a necessary issue, the district court
must not make its own factual determination but must rather remand the case to the board
to make that detem~ination.Univ. of Utah Hosp. v. Clerk of Minidoka County, 114 Idaho
662,665, 760 P.2d 1 , 4 (1988); accord, In re Application ofHayden Pines Water Co.,
111 Idaho 331, 336, 723 P.2d 875, 880 (1986) [...I
146 Idaho 226 [Underlining emphasis added].
Finally the Mercy, supra, Court held:
The resolution of factual issues cannot be made for the first time by the district court nor
can they be made by this Court on appeal. Univ. of Utah Hosp., 114 Idaho at 665,760
P.2d at 4. Under the APA, those findings properly belong to the agency. Id.
146 Idaho 226,
Therefore, if this Court decides that Bonner County erroneously decided the issue of
timeliness then the proper remedy is for this Court to remand for further proceedings and fact
finding on the issue of indigency.
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VI. CONCLUSION
There is substantial and competent evidence in the Record and Transcript in this matter to
support the conclusions and determinations of the Bonner County Board of Commissioners in
their denial of the Delayed Application due to the Patient's failure to submit a Delayed
Application according to provisions of Idaho Code $31-3505(4).
Respectfully submitted this 3 1st day of July, 2009.
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